Notes: Torts — Wrongful Discharge — Maryland Limits the Scope of the Wrongful Discharge Tort Where Statutory Civil Remedies Are Available. Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 316 Md. 603, 561 A.2d 179 (1989) by O\u27Connor, Daniel S.
University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 20
Issue 1 Fall 1990 Article 4
1990
Notes: Torts — Wrongful Discharge — Maryland
Limits the Scope of the Wrongful Discharge Tort
Where Statutory Civil Remedies Are Available.
Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 316 Md. 603, 561
A.2d 179 (1989)
Daniel S. O'Connor
University of Baltimore School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
O'Connor, Daniel S. (1990) "Notes: Torts — Wrongful Discharge — Maryland Limits the Scope of the Wrongful Discharge Tort
Where Statutory Civil Remedies Are Available. Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 316 Md. 603, 561 A.2d 179 (1989)," University of
Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 20: Iss. 1, Article 4.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol20/iss1/4
TORTS-WRONGFUL DISCHARGE-MARYLAND LIMITS 
THE SCOPE OF THE WRONGFUL DISCHARGE TORT 
WHERE STATUTORY CIVIL REMEDIES ARE 
AVAILABLE. Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 316 Md. 603, 
561 A.2d 179 (1989). 
Under the traditional doctrine of employment at-will, an em-
ployer may discharge employees without cause, for any reason, at 
any time absent a specific contract of employment for a fixed 
duration. I The freedom of the employer under this doctrine has been 
eroded through statutory exceptions, contract theories, and in a less 
defined sense, through public policy exceptions developed under the 
tort theory of wrongful discharge. In Makovi v. Sherwin- Williams 
CO.,2 the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in a 4-3 decision, limited 
the public policy exception by precluding a discharged employee from 
bringing a wrongful discharge tort action under the public policy 
exception because the policy allegedly affronted was contained in a 
statute that provided its own remedial scheme. This holding restricted 
further the already narrow scope of the wrongful discharge tort.3 
Consequently, it is likely that tort remedies will not be readily 
available as an alternative or an addition to the arsenal of statutory 
protections available to discharged employees. 
Until the 1981 decision in Adler v. American Standard Corp.,4 
Maryland courts had adhered to the employment at-will doctrine. s 
Despite the inflexibility of the at-will doctrine, employees are not 
totally unprotected. Since 1935, a variety of statutes have been 
enacted at both the federal and state levels providing protection to 
employees from unjust discharge. For example, federal and state 
laws protect employees from discharges motivated by discrimination 
based on race, color, religion, national origin, age, sex, marital 
I. For a discussion of the history and evolution of the at-will doctrine, see 
Comment, Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The 
Public Policy Exception, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1931, 1933-34 (1983). 
2. 316 Md. 603, 561 A.2d 179 (1989). 
3. The terms wrongful discharge, abusive discharge, and retaliatory discharge are 
synonomous. Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 36 n.2, 432 A.2d 
464, 467 n.2 (1981). In this note, the term "wrongful discharge" is used. 
4. 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981). 
5. See id. at 35, 432 A.2d at 467; see also State Comm'n on Human Relations 
v. Amecon Div. of Litton Sys., Inc., 278 Md. 120, 126, 360 A.2d I, 5 (1976); 
Vincent v. Palmer, 179 Md. 365, 370-71, 19 A.2d 183, 187 (1941); Washington, 
B & A.R.R. v. Moss, 127 Md. 12, 21, 96 A. 273, 276 (1915). 
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status, or physical or mental handicap.6 Additionally, employment 
may not be terminated because employees engage in protected union 
activity,' file worker's compensation claims,s refuse polygraph ex-
aminations,9 have their wages garnished,1O or serve on jury duty.l1 
Legislatures have been inconsistent, however, in enacting remedies 
for violations of those statutes. While some statutes provide civil 
remedies,12 other statutes provide criminal sanctions against employ-
ers, but no civil remedy for the discharged employee. 13 
In addition to the statutory exceptions, state courts have created 
common law exceptions to the at-will doctrine under three basic 
theories. First, the employer's discretion to terminate employees at-
will is limited where an express or implied contract exists. Where an 
employee enters into an express contract for employment, the terms 
and conditions of that contract will govern the termination of that 
employee. 14 Similarly, an implied contractual obligation may be de-
6. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 4(a) , 29 U.S.C. 
§ 623(a) (1988) (making it unlawful for an employer to discharge an individual 
because of that person's age); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 
794(a) (1988) (making it unlawful for otherwise qualified individuals with 
handicaps to be excluded from participation, denied benefits, or to be subjected 
to discrimination under any federal program or program receiving federal aid); 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703, 42 U.S.C § 2000e·2 (1988) (this act is commonly 
referred to as Title VII, and it prohibits terminations based on race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin); MD. ANN. CODE art. 498, §§ 14-18 (1986 & 
Supp. 1990) (prohibiting discriminatory discharges paralleling those classes 
protected at the federal level). 
7. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988). 
8. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 39A(a) (1985). 
9. MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 95 (1985 & Supp. 1990). 
10. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 15-606(a) (1990). 
11. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 8-105 (1989). 
12. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988) (providing equitable relief for employees 
subjected to employment discrimination including reinstatement and back pay); 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 498, § ll(e) (Supp. 1990) (remedy for violation may 
include reinstatment or hiring of employees with or without back pay). 
13. See, e.g., MD. LABOR & EMP. CODE ANN. §§ 3-702(c), (h) (1991). Section 3-
702(c) provides: "An employer may not require or demand as a condition of 
employment, prospective employment, or continued employment, that an in-
dividual submit to or take a lie detector or similar test." Section 3-702(h) 
provides: "An employer who violates any provision of this section is guilty of 
a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to a fine not exceeding $100." 
14. Maryland has recognized this proposition since 1876 when the court of appeals 
held that a discharge breached an express employment contract. See Cumberland 
& Pa. R.R. v. Slack, 45 Md. 161 (1876); see also Pittman v. Larson Distrib. 
Co., 724 P.2d 1379, 1383 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (discharge before the expiration 
of an express contract period without cause establishes basis for prima facie 
case of wrongful discharge); Larrabee v. Penobscot Frozen Foods, Inc., 486 
A.2d 97, 99 (Me. 1984) (employer's promise not to terminate except for cause 
in consideration for services establishes express contract on which a breach of 
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rived from the language contained in an employee handbook. IS Unless 
sufficiently specific, however, personnel policy statements by the 
employer do not establish a contractual obligation. 16 Second, some 
courts have recognized an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing in the employment relationship, a covenant that the employer 
may not breach. 17 Third, the employer's discretion to terminate at-
will is limited where the employer's motivation for the termination 
contravenes a clear mandate of public policy. 18 Maryland has rec-
ognized both the contract and public policy exceptions, but has not 
adopted the implied covenant of good faith exception. 19 
The public policy exception to the at-will doctrine took root in 
the 1959 California case of Petermann v. International Brotherhood 
oj Teamsters, Local 396.20 In Petermann, an employee was discharged 
after giving truthful testimony before a legislative committee contrary 
to his employer's directions to commit perjury.21 The Petermann 
court held that as a matter of "public policy and sound morality," 
the employer's conduct could not be condoned.22 The court reasoned 
that to "hold that one's continued employment could be made 
contingent upon his commission of a felonious act . . . would be to 
encourage criminal conduct. "23 Since Petermann, the public policy 
contract action may be maintained); Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 
S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (written contract must meaningfully 
provide that the employer does not have the right to terminate at will). 
15. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 
(1980). 
16. See MacGill v. Blue Cross of Md., Inc., 77 Md. App. 613, 620, 551 A.2d 501, 
504, cert. denied, 315 Md. 692, 556 A.2d 673 (1989); Staggs v. Blue Cross of 
Md., Inc., 61 Md. App. 381, 392, 486 A.2d 798, 803-04, cert. denied, 303 
Md. 295, 493 A.2d 349 (1985). In addition, handbooks do not create a contract 
if they contain a disclaimer. Castiglione v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 69 Md. App. 
325, 341, 517 A.2d 786, 793 (1986), cert. denied, 309 Md. 325, 523 A.2d 1013 
(1987). 
17. See, e.g., Price v. Federal Express Corp., 660 F. Supp. 1388 (D. Colo. 1987); 
Prevost v. First W. Bank, 193 Cal. App. 3d 1492, 239 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1987); 
Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977); 
Dare v. Montana Petroleum Mktg. Co:, 212 Mont. 274,687 P.2d 1015 (1984); 
Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974). 
18. See Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980); 
Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Holien v. 
Sears Roebuck & Co., 298 Or. 76, 689 P.2d 1292 (1984); Thompson v. St. 
Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984); Cordle v. General 
Hugh Mercer Corp., 325 S.E.2d 111 (W. Va. 1984); Brockmeyer v. Dun & 
Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983). 
19. See supra note 14 (contract); Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 
42-43, 432 A.2d 464, 471 (1981) (public policy). 
20. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959). 
21. [d. at 186, 344 P.2d at 26. 
22. [d. at 188-89, 344 P.2d at 27. 
23. [d. at 187, 344 P.2d at 27. 
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exception to at-will employment has been recognized in thirty-nine 
states.24 
Cases subsequent to Petermann have revealed that actionable 
employer motivations for discharging employees in violation of public 
policy fall within three distinct categories. First, employees have 
found redress under the wrongful discharge tort theory when dis-
charged for refusing to commit an unlawful act. Included are dis-
charges for refusal to commit perjury, 25 refusal to violate antitrust 
laws,26 and refusal to violate pollution control laws.27 Second, em-
ployees have found redress in tort when discharged for performing 
important public obligations such as insisting that the employer 
comply with state and federal product labeling and licensing laws28 
and performing jury duty against the employer's instructions.29 Within 
this category are the commonly known "whistleblower" cases where 
employees are discharged for reporting suspected illegal activity of 
the employer or co-employees.3o Third, tort remedies have been 
extended to employees discharged for exercising statutory or consti-
tutional rights,31 such as refusing to take polygraph examinations32 
and filing worker's compensation claims.33 
The reach of the public policy exception is broad in some states,34 
and narrow in others.35 For example, New Hampshire plaintiffs must 
24. See Employment At-Will State Rulings Chart, [9A Individual Employment 
Rights Manual] Lab. ReI. Rep. (BNA) 505:51-52 (Aug. 1989). 
25. See Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 
2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959). 
26. See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 
Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980). 
27. See Trombetta v.'Detroit, T. & Ironton R.R., 81 Mich. App. 489, 265 N.W.2d 
385 (1978). 
28. See Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 
(1980). 
29. See Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975). 
30. See, e.g., Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124,421 N.E.2d 
876 (1981) (criminal activity by co-employee); Adler v. American Standard 
Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981) (criminal activity by employer). 
31. Several courts have implied that the constitutional right to free speech might 
extend to a private sector employment relationship. See Novosel v. Nationwide 
Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983); Ring v. River Walk Manor, Inc., 596 
F. Supp. 393 (D. Md. 1984). 
32. See Townsend v. L.W.M. Management, Inc., 64 Md. App. 55,494 A.2d 239, 
cert. denied, 304 Md. 300, 498 A.2d 1186 (1985); Moniodis v. Cook, 64 Md. 
App. I, 494 A.2d 212, cert. denied, 304 Md. 631, 500 A.2d 649 (1985). 
33. See Kern v. South Baltimore Gen. Hosp., 66 Md. App. 441, 504 A.2d 1154 
(1986). 
34. See, e.g., CancelIier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1982), 
(age discrimination and wrongful discharge actions permissible); Monge v. 
Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (firing based on refusal 
to date supervisor contravened public policy); Lally, v. Copygraphics, 173 N. J. 
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show only that the discharge was motivated by their performance of 
an act that public policy would encourage, or refusal to perform an 
act that public policy would discourage. 36 Conversely, Wisconsin 
requires a plaintiff both to identify the public policy and to establish 
that the motivation for the discharge was in contravention of that 
policy.37 In each case, however, the overriding public policy consid-
erations have tempered the employer's discretion to discharge. 
When the Court of Appeals of Maryland was confronted with 
the issue of whether to adopt the public policy exception to employ-
ment at-will in Adler v. American Standard Corp.,3S the court adopted 
a narrow, conservative application of that exception. In response to 
certified questions from the United States District Court for the 
District of Maryland, the court of appeals held that "a cause of 
action for [wrongful] discharge by an employer of an at-will employee 
[will lie] when the motivation for the discharge contravenes some 
clear mandate of public policy. "39 The court in Adler limited the 
factual basis on which a wrongful discharge action could lie and 
required consideration of a balance among the employer's interests,40 
Super. 162,413 A.2d 960 (App. Div. 1980), ajl'd, 85 N.J. 668,428 A.2d 1317 
(1981) (plaintiff may elect either a common law or statutory remedy). 
35. See, e.g., Smith v. Atlas Off-Shore Boat Serv., 653 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(plaintiff must establish employer's objective as substantial motivating factor 
for discharge). 
36. See Howard v. Door Woolen Co., 120 N.H. 295, 414 A.2d 1273 (1980). 
37. See Ward v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 95 Wis. 2d 372, 290 N.W.2d 536 (1980). 
38. 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981). 
39. [d. at 47, 432 A.2d at 473. The court adopted the following definition of 
public policy: 
'Public policy is that principle of the law which holds that no 
subject can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious 
to the public, or against the public good, which may be termed, 
as it sometimes has been, the policy of the law, or public policy 
in relation to administration of the law.' 
[d. at 45, 432 A.2d at 472 (citing Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning 
Comm'n v. Washington Nat'l Arena, 282 Md. 588, 605, 386 A.2d 1216, 1228 
(1978) (citation omitted). The court in Adler further noted that declarations of 
public policy are normally the function of the legislative branch and to extract 
public policy from other sources "involves the application of a very nebulous 
concept to the facts of a given case." Adler, 291 Md. at 45, 432 A.2d at 472. 
In the view of one commentator, the Adler court's definition of public policy 
in the context of wrongful discharge raises considerable questions as to the 
scope of the public policy exception and borders on judicial legislation. See 
Abramson & Silvestri, Recognition oj a Cause oj Action jor Abusive Discharge 
in Maryland, 10 U. BALT. L. REV. 257, 271 (1981). 
40. Adler, 291 Md. at 42, 432 A.2d at 470. The court identified the employer's 
interests as important relative to the ability to discharge because of business 
needs. [d. 
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the employee's interests,41 and the interests of society as intended to 
be protected by the public policy involved.42 The court cited sources 
of public policy to include constitutions, statutes, prior judicial 
decisions, and administrative regulations. 43 
Adler involved an at-will employee who contended that his 
discharge was motivated by his employer's desire to conceal illegal 
corporate activities and that, therefore, his discharge was in contra-
vention of public policy.44 The employee had informed higher cor-
porate officials of the improprieties of company personnel, including 
claims of commercial bribery, alteration of financial records, and 
misuse of corporate funds. 45 The court of appeals held that the 
employee had failed to make out a Gause of action for wrongful 
discharge because his complaint was "too general, too conclusory, 
too vague and lacking in specifics to mount up to a prima facie 
showing that the claimed misconduct contravened" the public policy 
of Maryland.46 
Since Adler, Maryland courts have allowed both contractual 
employees47 and those who have resigned because the employer has 
made the working conditions intolerable48 to bring an action for 
wrongful discharge. Generally, however, the courts have interpreted 
the action very narrowly. The court of appeals, apparently content 
with the conservative application favored by the court of special 
appeals, has displayed a marked hesitancy even to consider lower 
court rulings. 49 The evolution of the wrongful discharge tort in 
41. Id. In the court's view, the employee's interests center upon the uncertainty 
and financial hardship that discharge could bring, particularly where continued 
employment is threatened for failure to act unlawfully or acting within a 
statutorily prescribed manner. Id. 
42. Id. The court found that society's interests consisted of "ensuring that its laws 
and important public policies are not contravened." Id. 
43. Id. at 45, 432 A.2d at 472. 
44. Id. at 34, 432 A.2d at 466. 
45. Id. at 33, 432 A.2d at 466. 
46. Id. at 44, 432 A.2d at 471. 
47. See Ewing v. Koppers Co., 312 Md. 45, 49, 537 A.2d 1173, 1175 (1988). 
48. See Beye v. Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, 59 Md. App. 642, 653, 477 A.2d 1197, 
1203, cert. denied, 301 Md. 639, 484 A.2d 274 (1984). The employer's actions 
in Beye consisted of allegedly failing to provide proper protection for an 
employee who had informed the police about illegal activities of co-employees. 
Id. at 645-47, 477 A.2d at 1199-1200. The court explained that constructive 
discharge is recognized where the employer's conduct deliberately causes or 
allows the employee's working conditions to become so intolerable that a 
reasonable person in the employee's position would have been compelled to 
resign. Id. at 653, 477 A.2d at 1203. 
49. The court of appeals has routinely denied certiorari even though the issues 
presented were significant relative to the scope of Adler. See, e.g., Townsend 
V. L.W.M. Management, Inc., 64 Md. App. 55, 494 A.2d 239, cert. denied, 
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Maryland cases since Adler has reduced the scope of the cause of 
action to one requiring a quite narrow and specifiC factual basis 
before a wrongfully discharged employee may even proceed beyond 
the summary judgment motions of defendant employers. 50 
The decision of the court of special appeals in Kern v. South 
Baltimore General Hospita[51 is illustrative of the restrictive applica-
tion and narrow factual basis on which a claim for wrongful discharge 
may be brought. In Kern, a· former employee filed a wrongful 
discharge claim contending that her discharge for absenteeism due to 
work related injuries was in contravention of the clear mandate of 
public policy embodied in Maryland's worker's compensation laws 
and in contravention of the state's public policy intended to protect 
employees from wrongful discharge for claiming statutorily mandated 
benefits. 52 Looking to the controlling statute, which precludes ter-
mination of employees "solely" because they file claims for benefits, 53 
the court held that because the termination was for absenteeism 
related to occupational injuries, and not "solely" because a claim 
was filed, the employee did not state a cause of action based upon 
the statutory public policy. 54 The court reasoned that the language 
of the statute only precludes termination for "filing" a worker's 
compensation claim and that termination for other reasons, even 
though related to the claim, is not prohibited by the statute. 55 The 
court recognized that for an Adler wrongful discharge action to lie, 
there must be a violation of a sufficiently clear mandate of public 
policy.56 Rejecting the employee's request to read the statute broadly 
for purposes of extracting public policy, the court concluded that 
such an expansion from the clear and unambiguous meaning of the 
statute is for the Legislature, not the courts. 57 
304 Md. 300, 498 A.2d 1186 (1985); Moniodis v. Cook, 64 Md. App. 1, 494 
A.2d 212, cert. denied, 304 Md. 631, 500 A.2d 649 (1985); Teays v. Supreme 
Concrete Block, Inc., 51 Md. App. 166, 441 A.2d 1109, cert. denied, 293 Md. 
547 (1982). In other significant cases, petitions for a writ of certiorari were 
not sought. See, e.g., Kern v. South Baltimore Gen. Hosp., 66 Md. App. 441, 
504 A.2d 1154 (1986). 
50. See Comment, supra note 1, at 1948 ("The Adler court's definition of public 
policy is surprisingly restrictive"); see also, Silkworth v. Ryder Truck Rental, 
70 Md. App. 264, 269, 520 A.2d 1124, 1127, cert. denied, 310 Md. 2, 526 
A.2d 954 (1987) (stating that the court in Adler recognized a very limited 
exception to the employment at-will rule). 
51. 66 Md. App. 441, 504 A.2d 1154 (1986). 
52. /d. at 445, 504 A.2d at 1156. 
53. MD. CODE ANN. art. 101 § 39A (1985). 
54. Kern, 66 Md. App. at 448, 504 A.2d at 1157. 
55. [d. 
56. [d. at 444, 504 A.2d at 1155. 
57. [d. at 449, 504 A.2d at 1158. 
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The narrow application of Adler, as illustrated in Kern, has 
precluded plaintiffs from recovering in tort for wrongful discharge 
even where the employer's actions were unlawful. For example, in 
Townsend v. L. W.M. Management, Inc. ,58 the court of special ap-
peals held that the state statute precluding discharge of an employee 
for refusing to take a polygraph examination is a clear mandate of 
public policy on which an action for wrongful discharge may be 
based. 59 The employer in Townsend, after discovering a cash theft 
from his business, requested four employees including the plaintiff 
to submit to a polygraph examination.60 After taking the test, the 
plaintiff was discharged.61 The court held that the plaintiff was 
discharged for theft and not for refusing to take a polygraph ex-
amination.62 Reading the statute literally, the court reasoned that 
discharge for theft does not violate the public policy reflected in the 
statute even though the determination that the plaintiff was the thief 
may have been based on the results of an unlawfully required 
polygraph examination. 63 
In Townsend, the court rejected the employer's contention that 
the criminal sanctions for violation of the statute were exclusive 
remedies which would preclude a wrongful discharge action.64 The 
court in Townsend cited the court of appeals decision in White v. 
Prince George's CountY'5 to distinguish exclusive remedies from 
others. In White, there existed a special "comprehensive remedial 
scheme" embodied in the statute for resolution of a particular 
58. 64 Md. App. 55, 494 A.2d 239, cert. denied, 304 Md. 300, 498 A.2d 1186 
(1985). 
59. [d. at 62, 494 A.2d at 243. The relevant statute in Townsend was Maryland's 
anti-polygraph law. See MD. CODE ANN. art. 100, § 95 (Supp. 1990). Both 
sections 95(b) and 95(g) were at issue. Section 95(b) provides: 
Test prohibited; exemption.-An employer may not demand or 
require any applicant for employment or prospective employment 
or any employee to submit to or take a polygraph, lie detector 
or similar test or examination as a condition of employment or 
continued employment. The prohibition of this section does not 
apply to the federal government or any agency thereof. 
[d. § 95(b). Section 95(g) provides "Penalty.-Any employer who violates the 
provisions of this subtitle is guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a fine not 
to exceed $100." [d. § 95(g). 
60. Townsend, 64 Md. App. at 64, 494 A.2d at 244. 
61. [d. 
62. [d. at 70, 494 A.2d at 247. 
63. [d. Although the court conceded that the employee probably had been required 
to submit to the polygraph in contravention of the statute, the court found 
that theft was the reason for the discharge and was dispositive of the issue. 
[d. at 69, 494 A.2d at 247. 
64. [d. at 62, 494 A.2d at 243. 
65. 282 Md. 641, 387 A.2d 260 (1978). 
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violation.66 The court in White noted that "absent a legislative 
intention to the contrary, it will usually be deemed that the Legislature 
intended the special statutory remedy to be exclusive. "67 The court 
in Townsend reasoned that the statutory criminal remedies did not 
constitute a special comprehensive remedial scheme and did not apply 
to a class of persons protected by its provisions.68 The analysis of 
the court of special appeals illustrates that the wrongful discharge 
tort action based on public policy is available to a plaintiff where 
the statute in which the public policy is embodied contains criminal 
sanctions but no civil remedies for employees alleging an unjust 
discharge.69 
Because the damages which may be recovered in other tort 
actions are also available in wrongful discharge suits, discharged 
employees have increasingly sought to fashion their pleadings as 
sounding in tort. 70 The holding of the court of special appeals in 
Moniodis v. Cook71 illustrates the benefit of this preference. In 
66. Id. at 647-48, 387 A.2d at 264 (citing MD. CODE ANN. art. 81, §§ 213-219 
(repealed 1985». The scheme provided that where a taxpayer erroneously or 
mistakenly pays to a state, county, or municipal agency more for special taxes 
than the taxpayer was properly and legally required to pay, the taxpayer is 
authorized to file a written claim for a refund and is entitled to a hearing. Id. 
at 649, 387 A.2d at 264. 
67. Id. at 649, 387 A.2d at 265. 
68. Townsend, 64 Md. App. at 63, 494 A.2d at 243. The court observed that the 
anti-polygraph statute was far from comprehensive and that discretionary 
prosecutorial authority for civil suits rested with the Attorney General. Id. 
69. See id. The crucial distinction in Townsend was that the civil remedies available 
reached only applicants for employment. The plaintiff was not an applicant, 
but rather a full-time employee. Therefore, the remedial scheme set forth by 
the legislature in the statute did not extend to the plaintiff. 
70. See Bacon, See You In Court, NATION'S BUSINESS, July 1989, at 18-20. The 
author describes at length the plethora of wrongful discharge cases pending 
nationwide and points to how plaintiffs often link a wrongful discharge claim 
to other tort claims for presentation to a jury. Based on juror hostility to 
employers, punitive damage awards have "ranged into the stratosphere." Id. 
at 20. Although Maryland has not been immune to this practice by plaintiffs, 
pendent tort claims do carry rather stringent requirements. For example, 
Maryland has strictly applied the elements of the tort of intentional infliction 
of emotional distress in wrongful discharge actions. See, e.g., Silkworth v. 
Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 70 Md. App. 264, 520 A.2d 1124 (1987) (employee's 
allegation that employer's act of firing was outrageous without supporting facts 
failed to meet outrageous requirement); Leese v. Baltimore County, 64 Md. 
App. 442, 472, 497 A.2d 159, 174-75, cert. denied, 305 Md. 106, 501 A.2d 
845 (1985) (employee's allegations of physical pain, emotional suffering, and 
great mental anguish were not sufficient to satisfy severity element); Continental 
Casualty Co. v. Mirabile, 52 Md. App. 387, 405, 449 A.2d 1176, 1187 (1982) 
(supervisor's actions in frequently moving employee's work station, verbally 
abusing him, and touching him on the nose were not sufficiently extreme and 
outrageous). 
71. 64 Md. App. 1,494 A.2d 212, cert. denied, 304 Md. 631,500 A.2d 649 (1985). 
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Moniodis, several contractual employees were discharged following 
their refusal to submit to a polygraph examination.72 Holding that 
the discharge was in violation of the clear mandate of public policy 
embodied in the state statute prohibiting polygraph examinations as 
a condition of employment, the court upheld a jury award of over 
one million dollars in compensatory and punitive damages. 73 Natu-
rally, aggrieved employees prefer the remedies available under com-
mon law tort theories over federal and state employment statutes 
which often preclude jury trials as well as compensatory and punitive 
damages.74 Consequently, many employees contending, for example, 
that their discharges were discriminatory, have sought to bypass 
remedial administrative procedures established in federal and state 
laws prohibiting discrimination, and instead have brought tort claims 
for wrongful discharge. 7s 
The majority of the courts considering whether to extend tort 
relief over the statutory framework established to resolve discrimi-
nation claims have declined to do SO.76 In Makovi v. Sherwin- Williams 
72. [d. at 6-7, 494 A.2d at 214-15. 
73. [d. at 25-26 & nn.2-4, 494 A.2d at 224-25 & nn.2-4. The statute at issue in 
Moniodis was the same as the one in Townsend. See supra note 59. 
74. See Bacon, supra note 70, at 24. 
75. See, e.g., Parlato v. Abbott Laboratories, 850 F.2d 203 (4th Cir. 1988) (age 
and race discrimination); Bernstein v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 843 F.2d 
359 (9th Cir. 1988) (age discrimination); Grubba v. Bay State Abrasives, 803 
F.2d 746 (1st Cir. 1986) (age discrimination); Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 
736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1984) (sex discrimination); Bruffet v. Warner Com-
munications, Inc., 692 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1982) (handicap discrimination); 
Lapinad v. Pacific Oldsmobile-GMC, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 991 (D. Haw. 1988) 
(sex discrimination); Napoleon v. Xerox Corp., 656 F. Supp. 1120 (D. Conn. 
1987) (race discrimination); Reeder-Baker v. Lincoln Nat'l Corp., 644 F. Supp. 
983, (N.D. Ind. 1986) (race discrimination), aff'd, 834 F.2d 1373 (7th Cir. 
1987); Lofton v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 170 (B.D. Pa. 1986) 
(race discrimination); Salazar v. Furr's, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 1403 (D. N.M. 
1986) (sex discrimination); Krushinski v. Roadway Express, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 
934 (M.D. Pa. 1985) (religion discrimination); Savage v. Holiday Inn Corp., 
603 F. Supp. 311 (D. Nev. 1985) (age and sex discrimination); Crews v. 
Memorex Corp., 588 F. Supp. 27 (D. Mass. 1984) (age discrimination); Chekey 
v. BTR Realty, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 715 (D. Md. 1983) (age discrimination); 
Ficalora v. Lockheed Corp., 193 Cal. App. 3d 489, 238 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1987) 
(sex discrimination); Gamble v. Levitz Furniture Co., 759 P.2d 761 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1988) (handicap discrimination), cert. dismissed, 782 P.2d 1197 (Colo. 
1989); Melley v. Gillette Corp., 19 Mass. App. 511, 475 N.E.2d 1227 (1985) 
(age discrimination), aff'd, 397 Mass. 1004, 491 N.E.2d 252 (1986); Holmes 
v. Haughton Elevator Co., 404 Mich. 36, 272 N.W.2d 550 (1978) (age discrim-
ination); Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 120 N.H. 295, 414 A.2d 1273 (1980) 
(age discrimination); Kofoid v. Woodard Hotels, Inc., 78 Or. App. 283, 716 
P .2d 771 (1986) (sex discrimination). 
76. See infra note 98. 
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Co. ,77 the Court of Appeals of Maryland joined the majority of 
jurisdictions rejecting the plaintiff's efforts to bypass available stat-
utory remedies in an attempt to achieve the more liberal tort recov-
eries under the public policy exception to employment at-will. 
Carolyn M. Makovi, employed at-will as a chemist, had been 
employed for nearly twenty-six months by the Sherwin-Williams 
Company at its paint manufacturing plant in Baltimore when she 
became pregnant.78 Two months later, her employer informed her 
that "'she could not work at her job while pregnant' [and] 'that her 
pay and medical benefits would cease until she became disabled 
because of her pregnancy."'79 Makovi remained out of work for 
eight months and then returned to her position.80 Construing the 
intervening period as a discharge motivated by sex discrimination, 
Makovi filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission.81 Finding no reasonable cause to believe that her alle-
gation was true, the Commission dismissed her complaint and notified 
her of the right to sue in federal court under Title VII. 82 Rather than 
pursue the statutory remedies available under Title VII, Makovi filed 
a private cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge in the Circuit 
Court for Baltimore City.83 The circuit court granted the employer's 
motion to dismiss.84 The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
affirmed, and the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari. 8S 
In Makovi, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a cause 
of action for wrongful discharge will not lie "where the public policy 
sought to be vindicated by the tort is expressed in a statute which 
77. 316 Md. 603, 561 A.2d 179 (1989). 
78. [d. at 605, 561 A.2d at 180. 
79. [d. 
80. [d. at 606, 561 A.2d at 180. 
81. Brief for Appellee at 6, Makovi v. Sherwin Williams Co., 75 Md. App. 58, 
540 A.2d 494 (1988) (No. 87-377). Makovi referred to the intervening period 
of unemployment as a termination of employment. [d. Neither the court of 
special appeals nor the court of appeals considered this intervening period as 
anything less than a discharge. Although the plaintiff in Makovi did not 
succeed in the wrongful discharge action, an unpaid administrative leave could 
suffice as a discharge and could potentially subject the employer to wrongful 
discharge liability. 
82. Makovi, 75 Md. App. at 60, 540 A.2d at 495. 
83. Makovi, 316 Md. at 605, 561 A.2d at 180. 
84. [d. at 606, 561 A.2d at 180. The circuit court treated the employer's motion 
to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Md. Rule 2-322(c). 
[d. at 606 n.3, 561 A.2d at 180 n.3. 
85. [d. at 606, 561 A.2d at 180. Prior to reaching the court of appeals, the plaintiff 
had to overcome both the circuit court and court of special appeals dismissal 
of her claim based on an inaccurate interpretation of the force of a premature 
order of appeal. See Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 311 Md. 278, 533 A.2d 
1303 (1987). 
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carries its own remedy for vindicating that public policy. "86 The 
court reasoned that the wrongful discharge tort is inherently limited 
to remedying discharges in violation of a clear mandate of public 
policy which would not otherwise be vindicated by a Civil remedy. 87 
Although the court recognized that the remedies available under the 
state and federal discrimination statutes are not exclusive and could 
be expanded by state legislative or judicial action,88 the court none-
theless disallowed the cause of action because the tort was established 
to fill a void in the law. 89 Therefore, the court concluded that a 
public policy cause of action will lie only where no adequate statutory 
remedy is available to a plaintiff to redress a wrongful discharge by 
an employer. 90 
The Makovi court explained that the judiCiary, when creating 
tort remedies in addition to those legislatively created, must not 
consider the public policy goal in a vacuum without a balanced 
consideration of the legislated remedies. 91 In this regard, the court 
found persuasive the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Bush v. 
Lucas.92 In Bush, the claimant sought a new nonstatutory damage 
remedy to vindicate a first amendment violation.93 The Court noted 
that it is not enough simply to determine that existing remedies do 
not provide complete relief, but that it instead required a determi-
nation of "whether an elaborate remedial system that has been 
constructed step by step, with careful attention to conflicting policy 
considerations, should be augmented by the creation of a new judiCial 
remedy. "94 The Court concluded that "Congress is in a better position 
to decide whether or not the public interest would be served by 
creating" a new substantive liability in addition to that already 
provided.95 In support of its holding in Makovi, the court of appeals 
examined the legal effect of superimposing a wrongful discharge 
cause of action on the existing framework of employment discrimi-
nation legislation. Consistent with the Supreme Court's analysis in 
Bush, the court in Makovi reasoned that because the statutory 
exceptions to employment at-will prohibiting discriminatory employ-
ment practices also limited the remedies for such discrimination, a 
86. Makovi, 316 Md. at 609, 561 A.2d at 182. 
87. [d. at 605, 561 A.2d at 180. 
88. [d. at 621-22, 561 A.2d at 188. 
89. [d. at 605, 561 A.2d at 180. 
90. [d. at 611-12, 561 A.2d at 183 (quoting Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams, Co., 75 
Md. App. 58, 64, 540 A.2d 494, 497 (1988». 
91. [d. at 623, 561 A.2d at 189. 
92. 462 U.S. 367 (1983). 
93. [d. at 368. 
94. [d. at 388. 
95. [d. at 390. 
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judicial holding expanding those remedies would upset the balance 
between the employee's legislated rights and the remedies established 
by the legislature to vindicate violations of those rights. 96 
Moreover, the court examined cases in both federal and state 
courts in which plaintiffs sought to extend a wrongful discharge 
action to reach status-based97 discharges in contravention of public 
policy embodied in federal and state discrimination statutes. A large 
majority of the other jurisdictions considering the issue declined to 
extend the public policy exception where a statutory civil remedy 
already existed to protect the aggrieved employee.98 The few cases 
permitting tort recovery in addition to the statutory remedies were 
based on the absence of legislative preemption.99 The court of appeals 
distinguished those cases because those courts had before them only 
preemption issues and were not confronted with the employer's 
argument in Makovi that the very nature of the tort was to fill a 
void in the law in order to provide a remedy where none had 
previously existed. loo 
The court in Makovi also considered the Eighth Circuit's decision 
in Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc.101 In Lucas, an employee, discharged 
allegedly for refusing to sleep with her foreman, based her wrongful 
discharge claim on public policy embodied in two separate statutes. 102 
One was a discrimination statute that provided a civil remedy, and 
the other reflected a clear public policy statement without providing 
a remedy.103 The court in Lucas, applying Arkansas law, held that a 
tort of wrongful discharge would lie on the statute with no remedy 
despite the available remedy under the other .104 The court in Makovi 
left no hint as to how it would resolve a case comparable to Lucas. 
In dissent, Judge Adkins105 agreed that the cause of action created 
in Adler was intended to fill a void in the law. 106 The dissent, 
96. Makovi, 316 Md. at 626, 561 A.2d at 190. 
97. "Status-based discharges" refers to persons discharged in contravention of 
public policy statements contained in both the federal and state employment 
discrimination statutes and includes employees discharged because of their 
status relative to race, color, religion, national origin, age, sex, marital status, 
or physical or mental handicap. 
98. Makovi, 316 Md. at 613-21, 561 A.2d at 184-88. Of thirty cases, representing 
twenty-one states, considering an expansion of the public policy exception as 
asserted by the plaintiff in Makovi, twenty-four cases, representing sixteen 
states, rejected the expansion of tort remedies. See id. 
99. [d. at 621, 561 A.2d at 188. 
100. Id. 
101. 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1984). 
102. Id. at 1203. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Judge Adkins was joined by Judges Eldridge and Cole. Makovi, 316 Md. at 
626, 561 A.2d at 190. 
106. Id. at 628, 561 A.2d at 191 (Adkins, J., dissenting). 
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however, disagreed with the majority's application of Adler. The 
dissent concluded that the element of the tort set forth in Adler 
which prohibits discharges based on motivations that contravene a 
clear mandate of public policy was the only prerequisite to the tort 
cause of action.107 The dissent read Adler as permitting an independ-
ent tort claim whenever a discharged employee could show that the 
employer's motivation for the discharge contravened a clear mandate 
of public policy, regardless of available statutory remedies.108 The 
dissent noted that in Ewing v. Koppers CO.I09 the court of appeals 
allowed a wrongful discharge action based on a public policy em-
bodied in a statute that provided criminal remedies against the 
violating employer. 110 The dissent perceived Ewing as a positive 
illustration "that the existence of some statutory remedy will not bar 
a common law [wrongful] discharge action."l1l 
The dissent also argued that the issue presented in Makovi turned 
on statutory preemption. 1I2 Although the majority and dissent agreed 
that the remedies contained in the state and federal discrimination 
statutes were not exclusive,1I3 the dissent concluded that absent leg-
islative preemption of independent tort remedies, an independent 
Adler tort action should lie. 1I4 Finally, the dissent concluded that 
such tort remedies would not upset the balance of the legislative 
framework of employment discrimination statutes because common 
law remedies supplement rather than hinder the goals of statutes. lIS 
Makovi presented the court of appeals with a choice of expanding 
tort remedies to extend relief in addition to the remedies contemplated 
by the legislature or of limiting the tort to situations in which a 
discharge in violation of clear public policy leaves an at-will employee 
without a remedy. Adopting the latter position, the majority opinion 
clearly comports with the majority of jurisdictions that have consid-
107. [d. at 628-29, 643, 561 A.2d at 191-92, 199. 
108. [d. at 628, 561 A.2d at 191. 
109. 312 Md. 45, 537 A.2d 1173 (1988). 
110. Makovi, 316 Md. at 628-29, 561 A.2d at 191-92 (Adkins, J., dissenting). 
Ill. [d. at 628, 561 A.2d at 191. 
112. [d. at 639, 561 A.2d at 197. Following a lengthy analysis of the legislative 
history of the remedial schemes of both Title VII and Article 49B, and 
subsequent judicial interpretations of employment discrimination remedies, 
Judge Adkins summarized by stating, "[g]iven the established absence of 
legislative preemption and related doctrines, as well as the established availa-
bility of diverse remedies for employment discrimination, it is difficult for me 
to follow the majority's argument that the statute establishing the policy against 
employment discrimination itself operates to bar the common law remedy." 
[d. 
113. [d. at 631, 561 A.2d at 192-93 (Adkins, J., dissenting). 
114. [d. at 643, 561 A.2d at 199 (Adkins, J., dissenting). 
115. [d. at 644-45, 561 A.2d 199-200 (Adkins, J., dissenting). 
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ered the issue,116 and it represents a sound continuation of the 
principles set forth in Adler. The court in Adler, while not confining 
itself to legislative enactments, prior judicial decisions, or adminis-
trative regulations when determining the public policy of Maryland, 
nonetheless expressed a preference for legislative enactments as the 
favored source of public policy. 117 It is a logical conclusion, as the 
court of appeals explained in Makovi, that the statutory remedies 
provided to eliminate violations of public policy are are also a part 
of the policy and are not to be viewed in isolation.1l8 
It is on this foundation that the court of appeals correctly 
rejected Makovi's position that the judicially created tort of wrongful 
discharge must lie unless legislatively preempted. Pointing to the 
policy of Congress as expressed in Title VII that nothing in the Act 
"shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from any liability, 
duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future law 
of any State,"1l9 the court of appeals appropriately concluded that 
a state's discretion to expand wrongful discharge to employment 
discrimination cases "is neither barred nor preordained by federal 
law."120 
In declining to provide expanded remedies for discharged plain-
tiffs, the court of appeals chose not to combine the remedies available 
under two separate and distinct exceptions to the at-will doctrine. It 
is clear that the statutory exception to the at-will doctrine made the 
initial inroads to the otherwise intact employment at-will doctrine. 121 
The public policy exception need not have been judicially created in 
the first instance had a statutory exception controlling the employer's 
actions already been in place. 
Thus, it follows that where a statutory exception exists which 
provides a considered, albeit limited remedy, a second exception to 
the at-will doctrine need not be required because protection of the 
employee's interests, the employer's interests, and the interests of 
society have been legislatively balanced and set forth as public policy 
in the form of a statute. In Makovi, the court of appeals has made 
clear that the wrongful discharge cause of action is available only 
where an employer's actions contravene a clear mandate of public 
policy and leave an injured plaintiff without available redress under 
a remedial statutory scheme. III This conjunctive requirement leaves 
intact the legislative exceptions to the at-will doctrine established by 
116. See supra note 98. 
117. Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31,45,432 A.2d 464, 472 (1981). 
118. Makovi, at 621, 561 A.2d at 188. 
119. Id. at 621, 561 A.2d at 188 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1988». 
120. Id. at 621-22, 561, A.2d at 188. 
121. See supra notes 6-13 and accompanying text. 
122. Makovi, 316 Md. at 605, 561 A.2d at 180. 
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state and federal employment discrimination statutes and presumably 
any other employment statutes providing both a public policy and a 
remedy for the plaintiff for violations of that policy by his employer. 
Were the court to extend tort remedies to plaintiffs discharged 
in contravention of public policy for which a statutory remedy exists, 
it would serve to encourage plaintiffs to circumvent the statutory 
remedial schemes legislatively developed. In addition to the back pay 
remedy presently provided in the discrimination statutes, for example, 
plaintiffs might seek the economic benefits of punitive damages under 
the tort theory. Discharged or constructively discharged employees, 
including both contract and at-will employees, would be left with no 
motivation to pursue claims under the statutory framework, thereby 
adversely affecting the entire legislative scheme. 
In sum, where statutory remedies are not available to unjustly 
discharged employees, they may potentially reap the benefits of tort 
damages for wrongful discharge. Conversely, where statutory reme-
dies are provided, the court will preclude discharged employees from 
pursuing a tort remedy. 
Daniel S. O'Connor 
